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American Cetacean Society v. Baidrige: A
Blow is Dealt to Executive Agreements
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the United States has seen an
unprecedented growth in the use of executive agreements.' This
growth has paralleled an equally dramatic increase in the power of the
President in foreign affairs. 2 During this same period, Congress has
played a very limited role in controlling executive actions in foreign
affairs. 3 The extensive use of executive agreements has been criticized
as a factor which has disrupted the delicate balance of foreign affairs
powers between the President and Congress. 4 Yet, in recent years,

Congress has attempted to assert greater influence over United States
foreign policy.5 In American Cetacean Society v. Baldrige,6 the Dis1. See InternationalExecutive Agreements: Hearings on S. 596, HR. 14365 and HR.
14647, Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972) (Statement of Senator Case)
"During the year 1930, 25 treaties and only nine executive agreements were entered into by the
United States. [In] 1968 . ..the record reflect[ed] more than 200 executive agreements in
comparison with only 16 treaties." Id.; L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 173 (1972); In 1941, there were well over 1,250 executive agreements, W. MCCLURE,
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES xii (1941); Stevenson, ConstitutionalAspects of the Executive Agreement Procedure, 66 DEP'T ST. BULL. 840 (1972). Of 5,306 treaties and other

international agreements in force for the United States as of January 1, 1972, 947 were treaties
and 4,359 were executive agreements. Id.
2. See Rovine, Congressional-Executive Relations and United States Foreign Policy, 17
WILLAMETTE L.J. 41, 42 (1980); F. WILCOX, CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE AND FOREIGN
POLICY 7-9 (1971); T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 3-6 (1979).
All of these authors suggest that Executive predominance in foreign affairs became subject to
strict scrutiny during the Vietnam War era.
3. See Rovine, supra note 2, at 42-43; see T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 2, at
3-4.
4. See Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1972); CongressionalReview of InternationalAgreements: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Int'l Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); CongressionalOversight of Executive Agreements-]975: Hearingson S.632 and S.1251
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
5. Rovine, supra note 2, at 42-43; T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 2, at 3-9.
6. 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Baldrige 111], aff'g Am. Cetacean
Soc'y v. Baldridge[sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1985), stay pending appeal denied, Am.
Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1411 (D.D.C. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S.Ct. 787 (1986).
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trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court
decision which voided an executive agreement between the United
States and Japan, because the agreement conflicted with a prior act of
Congress. 7 The court exhaustively analyzed the relevant statutes. 8
However, this decision involves several important questions regarding
the role of Congress and the executive in foreign affairs, as defined by
the Constitution, which were inadequately addressed by the court.
This note assumes that the statutory analysis performed by the
court of appeals was correct and focuses on the important constitutional issues which the court inadequately addressed. This note will
first discuss, under the heading of justiciability, whether the judiciary
is capable of deciding disputes involving the interrelationship of Congress and the executive in foreign affairs. 9 This note will conclude
that it was proper for the district court and the court of appeals to
have decided Baldrige III. Second, this note will analyze the issue of
the separation of powers between Congress and the executive in foreign affairs as defined by the Constitution. 10 This note will conclude
that in BaldrigeIII, the court of appeals properly held that the executive agreement did not supersede the prior acts of Congress."I By its
decision, the court dealt a serious blow to the unbridled use of executive agreements when restraints are imposed by Congress.
II.
A.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Statutory Background

In 1946, the United States signed the International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) which was formed "to estabfish a system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation and development of whale
7. 768 F.2d at 445.
8. 768 F.2d at 432-44.
9. See infra notes 73-166 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 167-326 and accompanying text.
11. The questions presented to the Supreme Court on the writs of certiorari are: whether
the court of appeals correctly interpreted the statutes and whether the issuance of a writ of
mandamus is appropriate. 54 U.S.L.W. 3468-69 (Jan. 14, 1986). The justiciability and separation of powers issues were not explicitly raised by the petitioners, even though they were alluded to by the court of appeals. If the Supreme Court finds that the statutes did not create a
mandatory duty to certify the Japanese, then the executive agreement was not entered into
contrary to an act of Congress and the discussion of justiciability and the separation of powers
in this article would become moot.
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stocks ....
,,12 Under article I of the ICRW, a "Schedule," containing specific rules and prohibitions regarding whaling practices, was
established. 13 The member nations of the ICRW also agreed to create
the International Whaling Commission (IWC) 14 to study whales and
whaling practices. 15 The IWC was given authority to amend the
ICRW Schedule by "fixing.

.

. [the] time, methods and intensity of

whaling (including the maximum catch of whales to be taken in any
one season) ....
,,"6 Under the terms of the Convention, any member nation that objects within ninety days to an IWC amendment to
the Schedule is not bound by that amendment.' 7 However, if an objection is subsequently withdrawn, the objection cannot be
8
reimposed.'
In 1971, realizing that adequate enforcement of international
fishery conservation programs did not exist, Congress passed the Pelly
Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967.19 The Pelly
Amendment states that after determining that the nationals of a foreign country are "diminish[ing] the effectiveness of an international
fishery conservation program, the Secretary of Commerce shall certify
such fact to the President. ' 20 After receiving certification from the
Secretary of Commerce, the President may then direct the Secretary
of the Treasury to prohibit the importation of that country's fish
products to the United States. 21 If the President does not impose
these sanctions, he must give reasons to Congress for his failure to do
12. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Preamble, Nov. 10, 1948, 62
Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. 1849 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
13. Id. at art. I, § 1.
14. Id. at art. III, § 1.
15. Id. at art. IV, § 1.
16. Id. at art. V, § 1(e).
17. Id. at art. V, § 3. These objection procedures are common to international conservation programs. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 34752 (1971) (Statement of Rep. Pelly). "Unfortunately, under the terms of the [International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries],
individual nations are permitted to exempt themselves from the decisions of the [International
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission]." Id.
18. Convention, supra note 12, at art. V, § 3.
19. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1983). See also H.R. REP. No. 468, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1971)
reprintedin 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. AD. NEWS 2409; 117 Cong. Rec. 34752 (1971) (Statement
of Rep. Pelly). The Pelly Amendment was an amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act

of 1967.
20. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1983).
21. Id. at § 1978(a)(4), as amended. As originally drafted the present 22 U.S.C.
§ 1978(a)(4) was 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(3). For discussion of subsequent amendment, see infra
notes 27 to 30 and accompanying text.
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In 1974 the Secretary of Commerce certified the Soviet Union
and Japan for IWC quota violations, and in 1978 the Secretary of
Commerce also certified the Republic of Korea and Peru for IWC
quota violations. 23 However, on both occasions the President did not
order the Secretary of the Treasury to impose the Pelly Amendment
sanctions against any of these nations. 24 Instead, the President used
the threat of discretionary sanctions to eventually obtain
25
compromises.
Because Congress perceived that the Secretary of Commerce was
delaying certification of nations that had violated IWC quotas 26 and
because the President had consistently failed to impose the discretionary Pelly Amendment sanctions, Congress passed the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment on August 15, 1979 (Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment). 27 To remedy the extensive delays in certification by the
Secretary of Commerce, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment requires the Secretary of Commerce to "periodically monitor the activities of foreign nationals that may affect [international fishery
conservation programs]," 28 "promptly investigate any activity by foreign nationals that, in the opinion of the Secretary, may be cause for
certification. .,,"29 and "promptly conclude. . .[that] investigation
.... "30

To remedy the consistent presidential failure to impose the

discretionary Pelly Amendment sanctions, the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment requires the Secretary of Commerce to order the Secretary of State to reduce by at least fifty percent a foreign nation's allocation of United States fishing rights, if the Secretary of Commerce
31
certifies that a nation has diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW.
22. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(b) (1983).
23. H.R. REP. No. 1029 (Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee), 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. AD. NEWS 1768, 1773. 22 U.S.C.
§ 1978(a)(4), as amended, authorizes the President to impose sanctions at his discretion.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1029, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. See 125 Cong. Rec. 22084 (1979) (Statement by Rep. Oberstar).
27. Act of Aug. 15, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407. Section 3(a) of this Act
amended the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e), by
adding 16 U.S.C. § 182 1(e)(2)(A)-(D); Section 3(b) of this Act amended Section 8 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978, by renumbering the previous § 1978(a)(3) as
§ 1978(a)(4) and inserting a new § 1978(a)(3).
28. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(3)(A) (1983).
29. Id. at § 1978(a)(3)(B).
30. Id. at § 1978(a)(3)(C).
31.
16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)-(B) (1983). See 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) for the procedures
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B.

The ProceduralHistory And Underlying Facts

In 1981, the IWC determined that no sperm whales from the
North Pacific, Western Division could be taken in any given years,
until catch limits for that year are established by the IWC. 32 Thus, if
the IWC could not agree on a catch limit, no whales could be taken
from that region for that year. 33 Japan, under the terms of the Convention, lodged an objection to this provision and, therefore, was not
34
bound by it.

In 1982, the IWC imposed a five year commercial whaling moratorium to begin in 1986 and last until 1990. 3 5 Japan, Norway, Peru
and the Soviet Union filed timely objections to the moratorium and,
therefore, under the terms of the Convention, 36 were not bound by the
decision. 37 In addition, at the 1982 annual meeting, Japan was
granted two additional years of sperm whaling. 38
In 1984, the IWC was unable to establish a specific quota for the
harvest of sperm whales from the North Pacific, Western Division for
for determining the allocation levels for foreign countries of allowable fishing levels in United
States waters. See 16 U.S.C. § 182 1(d) for the definitions of some relevant terms.
32.

INT'L WHALING

COMM'N, THIRTY-SECOND

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL

WHALING COMMISSION 17, 19-20, 40, 42 (1981) (Chairman's Report to the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting, app. 10). Footnote 1 to Table 3 to Annex A to Appendix 10 reads: "[n]o
whales may be taken from this stock [Sperm whales, North Pacific, Western Division] until
catch limits including any limitations on size and sex are established by the Commission." Id.
at 42.
33. Id. at 40.
34.

INT'L WHALING COMM'N, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION

OF WHALING, 1946, SCHEDULE 17 (March 1982).
35.

INT'L WHALING COMM'N, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION

OF WHALING, 1946, SCHEDULE 3, 13 (Feb. 1983, as amended by the Commission at the 34th
Annual Meeting, July 1982). Paragraph 10(e) reads:
catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the
1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at
the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects
of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the
establishment of other catch limits.
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
36. Convention, supra note 12, at art. V, § 3.
37. INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 35, at 13. Footnote * to paragraph 10(e)
states: '[t]he Governments of Japan, Norway, Peru and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics lodged objection to paragraph 10(e) within the prescribed period. This paragraph came
into force on 3 February 1983, but it not binding on those governments." Id.
38. Id. at 17. Footnote 2 to Table 3 is in boldface, indicating an amendment by the IWC
at the 34th Annual Meeting, July 1982. Footnote 2 reads: "catch limits for the 1982 and 1983
coastal seasons are 450 and 400 whales respectively .... ." Id.
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the 1984-85 season. 39 Thus, under the terms of the IWC Schedule, no
sperm whales from this region could be harvested for the 1984-85 season, except by Japan, because Japan's objection of 1981 was still in
force. 4o
On November 13, 1984, an executive agreement was executed
between Malcolm Baldrige, United States Secretary of Commerce,
41
and Yasushi Murazumi, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Japan.
Under the agreement the Secretary agreed not to certify Japan if Japan limited its sperm whale catch to 400 during the 1984-85 and
1985-86 seasons and if Japan withdrew its objection to footnote 1 of
Table 3 of the IWC Schedule (which stated that if the IWC did not
establish a catch limit then no sperm whales could be taken from the
North Pacific, Western Division). 42 Moreover, if Japan agreed by
April 1, 1985 to cease all Japanese commercial whaling after the
1986-87 season and if Japan agreed to limit its minke and Bryde's
whales catches to levels "acceptable" to both the United States and
Japanese governments, then the Secretary would not certify Japan for
taking up to 200 sperm whales during the 1986 and 1987 coastal seasons. 43 On December 11, 1984, Japan withdrew its objection to footnote 1 of the IWC Schedule's Table 3.44
The plaintiffs in Baldrige III are twelve wildlife conservation
groups. 45 On November 11, 1984, several members of one of the
39.

INT'L WHALING COMM'N, THIRTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHAL-

COMMISSION 14, 30 (1985) (Chairmen's Report of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting, app.
4, Table 3 n.1).
40. Id.
41. Letter from Yasushi Murazumi, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Japan, to The Honorable Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce (Nov. 13, 1984) and Letter from Malcolm
Baldrige to Yasushi Murazumi, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Japan (Nov. 13, 1984) [hereinafter cited as November Executive Agreement] reprintedin Appendix to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, apps. K
and L, at 102a-09a. Attached to the Letter from Murazumi to Baldrige is a "Summary of
Discussions on Commercial Sperm Whaling in the Western Division Stock of the North Pacific, November 1-12, 1984, Washington, D.C.," signed November 13, 1984 [hereinafter cited
as Summary of Discussions]. Dr. John V. Bryne, United States Commissioner to the International Whaling Commission, and Mr. Hiroya Sano, Director-General, Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Government of Japan were the chief
negotiators for each side.
42. November Executive Agreement, supra note 41, app. K, at 104a-05a.
43. November Executive Agreement, supra note 41, app. K, at 105a-06a.
44. Letter from Yoshio Okawara, Ambassador of Japan, to The Honorable Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce (Dec. 11, 1984) reprinted in Appendix to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, app. M, at 1 10a.
45. The twelve plaintiffs in this action are: American Cetacean Society, Animal Protection Institute of America, Animal Welfare Institute, Center for Environmental Education, The
ING
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plaintiffs' organizations documented the killing of two sperm whales
by Japan, in violation of the IWC's zero quota. 46 The plaintiffs demanded that the Secretary certify the Japanese and impose the sanctions.47 The Secretary of Commerce, however, refused to certify the
Japanese, indicating that he would abide by the November executive
agreement. 48 As a result, the plaintiffs filed an action for (1) a declaratory judgment that the Secretary's failure to certify the Japanese was
in violation of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, (2) a
declaratory judgment that whaling activities by any nation in excess
of an IWC quota is an activity which "diminishes the effectiveness" of
the ICRW, and (3) a permanent injunction enjoining any executive
agreements which would violate the certification and sanction requirements of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 49
III.

A.

REASONING OF THE COURT

United States District Court Decision

The main issue before the district court was whether the Pelly
and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments created a discretionary or
mandatory duty of the Secretary of Commerce to certify the Japanese
for violations of IWC quotas. 50 District court Judge Charles Richey
determined that the "case is a simple issue of statutory interpretation. ' ' 51 He then extensively analyzed the legislative history of the
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments and the executive
branch's applications of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 52 From this analysis, he concluded that the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments required the Secretary of Commerce to certify to the President that Japan had violated the IWC
quota.5 3 In addition, he concluded that a writ of mandamus was apFund for Animals, Greenpeace U.S.A., The Humane Society of the United States, International Fund for Animal Welfare, The Whale Center, Connecticut Cetacean Society, Defenders
of Wildlife and Friends of the Earth. Brief for Appellees, Appeal from the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia ii (1985).
46. Am. Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (D.D.C. 1985) (Affidavit of J. Campbell Snowden) [hereinafter cited as Baldrige 1].

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1401.
50. Id. at 1405. The court states "the only true issue in this case is whether there exists a
nondiscretionary duty to certify and did the Secretary fail to do so." Id. at 1408.
51. Id. at 1410.

52.

Id. at 1404-08.

53.

Id. at 1410.
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propriate in this case and, therefore, permanently enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from entering into any future executive agreement
contrary to his mandatory duty under the Pelly and PackwoodMagnuson Amendments. 54 Judge Richey also denied defendants' motion to stay the court's order pending appeal. 55
Although the court performed primarily a statutory analysis, it
did make some statements regarding the justiciability and separation
of powers issues. The court, especially critical of the Secretary's action, stated: "[tihe Secretary of Commerce may not unilaterally, or
even bilaterally with the Japanese, dismiss the mandate of the IWC so
56
as to proceed with his own particular vision of whale preservation.
The court seems to conclude that the Secretary may never disobey
this statutory mandate. Also, the court recognized that it was abrogating the November Executive Agreement by ordering the Secretary
of Commerce to certify the Japanese. 57 Yet, the court did not comment on or provide any authority for this conception of the separation
of powers issue. Presenting an interesting conception of the interrelationship of Congress and the Executive, the court stated that "this
nation is a republic, wherein the Executive Branch is not free to ignore the will of Congress or the requirements of the Constitution, and
where the legality of Administration action is subject to judicial review." 5 8 With this statement, the district court, in effect, concluded
that the case was justiciable, and that an executive agreement does not
supersede a prior inconsistent act of Congress.
B.

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
1. The majority opinion

The court of appeals affirmed the district court decision,
although for slightly different reasons. 59 Judge Skelly Wright, writing
for the majority, performed an analysis of the Pelly and PackwoodMagnuson Amendments' legislative history similar to, but even more
54. Id.
55. Am. Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1411 (D.D.C. 1985) [hereinafter cited
as Baldrige II]. On appeal the stay was granted, Baldrige II, 768 F.2d at 432.
56. Baldrige I, 604 F. Supp. at 1411.
57. Baldrige II, 604 F. Supp. at 1414.
58. Id. at 1415.
59. Baldrige III, 768 F.2d at 428. On appeal the defendants only argued that the district
court made an erroneous interpretation of the law and unlawfully issued the writ of mandamus. Id. at 432. They did not claim that the issue was nonjusticiable or that an executive
agreement supersedes a prior act of Congress.
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extensive than that by Judge Richey of the district court. 6 He concluded that, according to the statutes as amended, the Secretary of

Commerce has a mandatory duty to certify any violation of an IWC
quota.

61

Judge Wright's only statment as to the justiciability and separation of powers issues, which were alluded to in the district court opinion, 62 was:

Although it is urged that deference to the Executive is particularly
apt and intrusion by the judiciary particularly inapt in the foreign
affairs context, it is imperative to remember that the Legislative
Branch, by explicit constitutional provision, has the power to regulate foreign commerce. . . . And, since the judiciary's role is to
declare what the law is when Congress has acted, ...
we must
63

perform that duty even in this delicate context.
It is unfortunate that so little analysis was performed on these issues
considering their importance to the working of United States foreign
policy.
2.

The dissent

In his dissent, Judge Oberdorfer correctly stated that the threshold issue in Baidrige III was whether a justiciable question exists, especially since the case involved foreign affairs. 64 He also correctly
pointed out that the majority failed to address this threshold issue. 65
Judge Oberdorfer believed that the court should not decide this case,
66
because a decision would "entangle the judiciary in foreign policy"
and because a decision would "in effect require the Secretary to dishonor the United States' commitment, upon which Japan relied
....

"67

Although Judge Oberdorfer considered the justiciability

68
question important, he proceeded to the merits of the case.
Judge Oberdorfer also reviewed the legislative history of the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 434-43.
Id. at 443-44.
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
Baldrige III, 768 F.2d at 444.
Id. at 447.

65.
66.

Id.
Id.

67. Id.
68. Id. "This is not to say that the factors which call justiciability into question are not
relevant here. In my view, these factors heighten the need for forbearance by the courts in the
absence of a clear command from Congress." Id.
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Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 69 Unlike the majority,
however, he concluded that the Secretary of Commerce has a discretionary duty under the amendments to certify Japan for IWC quota
violations. 70 The dissent considered it particularly relevant in foreign
affairs cases not to construe a mandatory duty on the Executive absent a clear congressional mandate. 71 Regarding the role of the Executive in foreign affairs, Judge Oberdorfer stated "we should be
particularly hesitant to contradict the Executive's interpretation of a
statute relied upon to form an international agreement, unless the interpretation is clearly erroneous.
IV.

'72

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

A.

Justiciability

Before proceeding to the merits of a case, a federal court must
establish that the case is justiciable. 73 Justiciability is a judicially selfimposed set of principles based on article III's limitation of jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies. ' 174 The court will only decide
those cases which are adversarial in nature and which are historically
of the type capable of judicial resolution. 75 Although a case may be
nonjusticiable for a number of reasons, 76 only standing, ripeness and
the political question doctrine are potentially dispositive in the Baldrige III case. When discussing these three aspects of justiciability, it
is important to remember that "[j]usticiability is of course not a legal
concept with fixed content or susceptible to scientific verification. Its
utilization is the result of many subtle pressures, including the appropriateness of the issues for decision . . .and the actual hardship to
69. Id. at 448.
70. Id. at 448-49.
71. Id. at 449.
72. Id. at 448.
73. Yet, "j]usticiability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope." Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
74. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases...
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made under their Authority. . .to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party; to Controversies between two or more States.
...
); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
198 (1962). In Baker, Justice Brennan stated: "[i]n the instance of determining justiciability
. . .the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection
for the right asserted can be judicially molded." Id.
75. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-7, at 53 (1978).
76. A case may be nonjusticiable based on problems of standing, ripeness, mootness,
political question or inadequacy of equitable remedies. L. TRIBE, supra note 75, §§ 3-8 to 3-17.
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' 77
the litigants of denying them the relief sought."

1.

Standing

Standing involves a determination of whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial
resolution of that controversy. '7 8 When standing is at issue "the
question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a
proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not
whether the issue itself is justiciable. ' 79 To establish standing in a
case such as Baldrige 111,80 the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they
have suffered or will suffer some concrete injury in fact which is not
the same as the injury to all other citizens, 8' the defendants' act
caused the plaintiffs' injuries and the relief sought would probably redress the plaintiffs' injury.8 2 Neither the district court nor the court
83
of appeals addressed these elements of standing.
In Baldrige I, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and
injunction against the Secretary of Commerce regarding IWC whale
quota enforcement.8 4 Baldrige I is similar in many ways to Sierra
Club v. Morton. 85 In Sierra Club, an environmental group sought a
declaratory judgment and injunction against federal officials regarding
the approval of construction of a ski resort in a national forest. 86 The
Supreme Court held that injury to "aesthetic and environmental wellbeing" was sufficient to establish standing, but that the plaintiff did
not allege that any members of its group were personally among the
77. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
78. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note
75, §§ 3-17 to 3-22.
79. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99-100.
80. A different standing test is used for citizenship and taxation cases. See Frothingham
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Flast, 392 U.S. at 95; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166 (1974); Valley Forge College v. American's United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974).
81. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35. See L. TRIBE, supra note 75, §§ 3-20 to 3-21, at 8993.
82. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-74 (1978).
83. See Baldrige 1, 604 F. Supp. at 1401. Judge Richey suggests a standing discussion by
referring to the plaintiffs as "wildlife conservation groups which share a common dedication to
preserving and protecting endangered species." Id.
84. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
85. 405 U.S. 726 (1972).
86. Id. at 728-30.
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injured.8 7 In its amended complaint, the plaintiff solved the standing
88
problem.
Using the reasoning of Sierra Club, the plaintiffs in BaidrigeIII
could not establish standing by alleging that they represent a general
concern for whale conservation and United States whale conservation
policies. Instead, the plaintiffs must establish that some members of
the environmental groups have suffered an injury to their individual
"aesthetic and environmental well-being" when using the area where
the whales were seen.8 9 Unlike Sierra Club, however, the acts giving
rise to the cause of action in Baldrige III did not occur in the United
States; the IWC quota violations occurred in the Western Division of
the North Pacific. 90 There is evidence in the record, however, that
members of the plaintiffs' organizations do travel in the Western Division of the North Pacific; these members witnessed the killing of two
sperm whales in Japan. 9' Thus, these members could allege that they
suffered injury to their aesthetic and environmental well-being and do
frequent the area to view whales. However, the issue remains
whether, under Sierra Club, the concrete injury to a member of the
plaintiffs' organization must occur in the United States. 92 Because
standing is primarily concerned with whether the party suing actually
suffered the injury, 9 3 the place of the injury would seem irrelevant to a
determination of the standing issue. Therefore, standing should not
render the Baldrige III case nonjusticiable.
2.

Ripeness

Ripeness is another element of justiciability which a court must
94
address when constitutional issues affecting legislation are involved.
87.

Id. at 734-35.

88. Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (Motion to dismiss
amended complaint denied).
89. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 728-30.
90. See supra notes 32, 38-39 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
94. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947). For the Court, Justice
Rutledge held: "[thus] the constitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined in
friendly, non-adversary proceedings; in advance of the necessity of deciding them .... " Id.;
Poe, 367 U.S. at 503-04 ("[the] various doctrines of 'standing,' 'ripeness,' and 'mootness'...
are but several manifestations . . . of the primary conception that federal judicial power is to
be exercised to strike down legislation. . . only at the instance of one who is himself immediately harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged action." Id.; Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-14 (1976).
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In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
the Court stated that "[ilt has. . . been a firm and unvarying practice
of Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive on the parties and none that are subject to later review or alteration by administration action."' 95 Thus, the ripeness issue in
Baldrige III is whether the court's interpretation of the acts of Congress will be binding on the parties.
The case of Goldwater v. Carter9 6 is an excellent example of a
case not yet ripe for adjudication. In Goldwater, a group of United
States Congressmen sued the President for terminating a United
States-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty without prior Senate or congressional approval. 97 While the case was being heard, Congress was
still considering a resolution on the matter. 98 Justice Powell concluded that the case was nonjusticiable because when suit was brought
there was no clear indication of conflict between the President and
Congress.99 He stated that
a dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting
its constitutional authority. . . .The Judicial Branch should not
decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage . . .[individuals]
to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the conflict. 100
In Baldrige III, however, both Congress and the Executive have asserted their constitutional authority through the normal political process; Congress enacted the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments and the Secretary of Commerce signed the November
Executive Agreement.' 0 ' Unlike Goldwater, there is a clear conflict
between the action taken by the Secretary and the action required by
the acts of Congress as interpreted by the court. 102
95. 333 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1948).
96. 444 U.S. 996 (Powell, J., concurring). But see, id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting), id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 997-98.
98. Id. at 998.
99. Id.

100. Id. at 997.
101.
102.

Baldrige III, 768 F.2d at 428-32.
Id. at 432.
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The political question doctrine in foreign affairs

While standing involves the question of who is an appropriate
plaintiff, and mootness and ripeness involve the question of when it is
appropriate to file suit, the political question doctrine involves the
question of which branch of government is to decide the issue - the
judiciary, or one of the "political branches." 10 3 Also, while standing,
mootness and ripeness address the "case" or "controversy" requirement of article III, the political question doctrine "is primarily a function of the separation of powers." 10 4 The origin of the political
question doctrine is probably a statement by Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he
is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country
in his political character, and to his own conscience ...
[W]hatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist,
no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political.
They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted
0 5
to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.1
In recent years, there has been much confusion regarding the nature and extent of the political question doctrine. 0 6 Three distinct
views have prevailed: the classical view, the prudential view and the
functionalist view. 10 7 Under all three views, when the Constitution
grants Congress or the Executive sole authority to resolve an issue,
103. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1961). The "political branches" are Congress and
the executive, because both of these branches decide "political" as compared to "legal" or
"constitutional" matters. As Henkin stated, "there is little agreement as to . . . how the
courts decide whether a question is 'political.' "L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 210. See generally
L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 3-16, at 71-79; Roberts, Hopson v. Kreps: Bowhead Whales, Alaskan Eskimos, and the Political Question Doctrine, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 231, 231-36
(1981).
104. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. Note that separation of powers as discussed in the context of
justiciability relates to the relationship between the judiciary vis-a-vis Congress and the executive; the separation of powers discussion, see infra notes 167-326 and accompanying text, refers
to the relationship between Congress vis-a-vis the executive. Thus, Baldrige III involves the
interrelationship of all three branches of the federal government.
105. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803) (emphasis added).
106. See, e.g., L. HENKI, supra note 1, at 210-11; L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 3-16, at 71;
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. There is much debate whether the political question doctrine even
exists as an independent doctrine. See Henkin, Is there a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine, 85
YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Tigar, The PoliticalQuestion Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA
L. REV. 1135 (1970).
107. L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 3-16, at 71-72 nn.l-2.

1986]

American Cetacean Society v. Baldrige

the Judiciary cannot interfere.' 0 8 Under the classical view, if the Constitution does not grant Congress or the Executive sole authority to
resolve an issue, then a court must decide the issue. 10 9 Under the
prudential view, even if the Constitution does not grant the political
branches sole authority to decide an issue, a court may still refuse to
decide the case if a decision would "force the court to compromise an
important principle or would undermine the court's authority."o
The functionalist view is broader than the prudential view. Under the
functionalist view, even if the Constitution does not grant the political
branches sole authority to decide an issue, a court may still refuse to
decide a case if special considerations exist, other than concern for the
court's integrity or principles."I
a.

the Baker v. Carr analysis

In the seminal case of Baker v. Carr,the Court created a six-step
political question analysis. 1 2 In Baker, Justice Brennan stated that a
case is nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine if any one
of the following factors are an integral part of the case:
[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of
a court's undertaken independent resolution without expressing
lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. "13
108. Id. at 71 n.1.
109. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Natural Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1959), Weston, PoliticalQuestions, 38 HARV. L. REV. 298 (1925). See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 75, § 3-16, at 71-79. The classical view is consistent with a strict reading of
Marbury v. Madison and urges a broad scope of judicial review. Id. at 71 n. 1.
110. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 23-28, 89-91 (1962); Finkel-

stein, JudicialSelf Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REV. 221 (1976). See L. TRIBE, supra note 75,
§ 3-16, at 71-73 n.1.
111.

L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 3-16, at 71 n.1. Such factors might include inadequate

judicial knowledge to decide a case, need for uniformity of decision and respect for the other
political branches. Id. See, e.g., Scharpf, JudicialReview and the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine:
A FunctionalAnalysis,75 YALE L.J. 517, 566-82 (1966).

112. 369 U.S. 186, 208-37. See also id. at 241-47 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 266-67,
277-302, 323-30 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 217.
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Therefore, only the absence of all six of these factors will render a case
justiciable. This model combined elements of the classical view (factor 1), the functionalist view (factors 2 and 3) and the prudential view
(factors 4, 5 and 6). 114 Thus, by establishing this test, the Court inherently rejected the classical view.
In Baker, Justice Brennan specifically discussed the political
question doctrine as it relates to foreign affairs."' He rejected prior
case holdings which had concluded that all cases involving foreign
6
affairs are nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine."l Justice Brennan urged in all cases, including foreign affairs, a "discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the
history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the
specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action."'17

In Baldrige III, neither the majority nor the dissent performed
the discriminating analysis required in Baker.1 8 Although the majority in Baldrige III does not expressly address the political question
doctrine, it concludes that "since the judiciary's role is to declare
what the law is when Congress has acted

. . .

we must perform that

duty even in this delicate context."' 1 9 Thus, in essence, the majority
relied on the classical view of the political question doctrine. 20 Yet,
as stated above, the classical view was rejected in Baker.
The dissent in Baldrige III did mention the political question
doctrine. It addressed the need for a discriminating analysis before
proceeding to the merits and some of the factors of the Baker test.12
114. L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 3-16, at 72 n.1. Some authors suggest that all three views
can be combined into one theory. See generally, Roberts, supra note 103. Yet, the classical
view, by definition is inconsistent with either the prudential or functionalist views. See supra
notes 109-11 and accompanying text. Therefore, although the Baker analysis contains elements of all three views, by using discretionary elements of the prudential and functionalist
views, the Baker analysis rejects the classical view.
115. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-13.
116. Id. at 211-12. Justice Brennan stated "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id. at 211.
117. Id. at 211-12.
118. Baldrige 11I, 768 F.2d at 444, 447-49. The majority failed to address the political
question doctrine because it did not consider the implications of its decision on the conduct of
foreign affairs. The majority considered the case to be simply a matter of statutory interpretation. Id. at 432.
119. Id. at 444 (emphasis added). In this quotation the court referred to Marbury v.
Madison, the foundational case for the classical view. L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 3-16, at 71
n. 1.
120. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
121. Baldrige III, 768 F.2d at 447.
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Yet, the dissent in Baldrige III, stated that it was unnecessary to perform a discriminating analysis because the justiciability issue had serious constitutional implications and because great deference should be
shown the Executive's interpretation of a statute in foreign affairs, unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous. 22 The dissent then concluded that the Secretary's interpretation of the Pelly Amendment
was not clearly erroneous, especially because it involves foreign affairs. 23 This seems to be circular reasoning.
The dissent also used the holding in Adams v. Vance' 24 as authority for avoiding the political question doctrine and proceeding to
the merits. The court of appeals in Adams stated that
when the merits of a case are clearly against the party seeking to
invoke the court's jurisdiction, the jurisdictional question is especially difficult and far-reaching, and the inadequacies in the record
or briefing make the case a poor vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional question, we may rule on the merits .... 125
The proceedings in Adams were extraordinarily rapid: the suit was
filed, a district court order was entered, the defendant appealed and
the court of appeals reversed the lower court decision in just four
days. 26 However, in Baidrige III, the record and briefing were not
inadequate and the case did not require as rapid adjudication as was
necessary in Adams. 27 Thus, it seems inappropriate for the dissent to
have avoided the political question doctrine.
b. application of the Baker test
As mentioned in the previous section, both the majority and dissent in Baldrige III failed to perform the discriminating analysis required by Baker. 28 In this section each of the six elements of the
122.

sary to.

Baldrige 111, 768 F.2d at 447-49. "For the present purposes, however, it is not neces.

. determine whether this case is justiciable. The justiciability issue has serious con-

stitutional implications which make it appropriate to bypass the question and proceed to the

merits." Id. at 447. "I am not persuaded that the Secretary's interpretation of the Pelly

Amendment was clearly erroneous." Id. at 448.
123. Id. at 448. Judge Oberdorfer, dissenting, stated "if this statute involved domestic
affairs, I might be able to endorse a [mandatory duty on the Secretary] based on [the] secondary evidence of congressional intent." Id.
124. 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
125. Id. at 954 n.7.
126. Id. at 953.
127. The plaintiffs in Baldrige I filed suit on November 8, 1984. Baldrige III, 768 F.2d at
446 n.l. Baldrige I was decided on March 5, 1985 and the stay pending appeal was denied on
March 13, 1985 (Baldrige II); Baldrige III was decided on August 6, 1985.
128. Each case involves several sub-issues. Part of the problem in any opinion which in-

344

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.

[Vol. 8:327

Baker test will be applied to the facts of Baldrige III to determine
whether it is justiciable under the political question doctrine.
In applying the Baker test, a court should first consider whether
there was "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department." 12 9 In Baidrige III, the
majority correctly concluded that under the Constitution, the Judici130
ary has sole authority to interpret statutes.
A corollary to this first prong of the Baker test is: "[if] the performance of a 'duty' is left to the discretion and good judgment of an
executive officer, the judiciary will not compel the exercise of his discretion one way or the other. . . for to do so would be to take over
the office." 13 1 Thus, in Baldrige III, a court should first determine if
the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments create a duty which
is left to the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce. If the amendments do create a discretionary duty, the case is not justiciable. However, if the amendments create a mandatory duty, then a court,
according to Baker, must determine whether any of the other factors
are present which would make the case nonjusticiable.
A court should next consider whether there was "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the
case]. ' 1 3 2 In Baldrige III, the determination of these factors depends
on which sub-issue is addressed. The competence of courts to pervolves a political question analysis is that different judges will focus on different sub-issues. In
Baldrige III, some of the sub-issues include: whether the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments create a discretionary or mandatory duty, whether these amendments are constitutional, whether the executive agreement supersedes the amendments, and whether it is
proper for a court to issue a writ of mandamus. In BaldrigeIII, the majority focused primarily
on the first sub-issue - whether the court has the authority to determine whether the Pelly
and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments create a discretionary or mandatory duty. The dissent, however, focused on whether a court should decide whether an executive agreement supersedes the amendments. Baldrige 11, 768 F.2d at 444, 447-49.
129. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
130. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 ("It is emphatically the province of and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is." Id.)
131. Baker, 369 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). Thus, if Congress gave the Secretary absolute discretion to certify a foreign nation under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments, then the courts should not review the matter. Possible exceptions to this general
rule might include the issues of abuse of discretion by the executive (See, Rainbow Navigation,
Inc. v. Department of the Navy, 620 F. Supp. 534 (D.D.C. 1985)) and improper delegation of
authority. The improper delegation of authority issue is beyond the scope of this article; the
abuse of discretion issue does not effect this analysis, because the assumption of this paper is
that the court of appeals finding of a mandatory duty was correct.
132. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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form statutory analysis has long been established. 13 3 Yet, due to the
ambiguity in the Constitution regarding the separation of powers of
the Executive and Congress in foreign affairs, adequate judicial standards, arguably, do not exist. 134 However, it is the duty of a court to
determine the meaning of the Constitution, no matter how difficult
that task might be. 135 Even the determination of whether an executive agreement supersedes a prior inconsistent act of Congress is a
matter of constitutional interpretation.
There is a tremendous debate regarding the power of the courts
to interpret the Constitution in matters involving the separation of
powers in foreign affairs. 136 Yet, Henkin suggests that the reason for
judicial deference in constitutional interpretation of matters affecting
foreign affairs is not that courts should demonstrate extraordinary abstention in this area, but that courts usually find that the Constitution
grants generous powers to Congress or the Executive. 37 If one accepts this view, the courts have exercised judicially discoverable standards. Thus, in Baidrige III, there are judicially discoverable
standards for determining whether the Constitution holds that an executive agreement supersedes a prior act of Congress. If a court finds
that the Constitution does create such a right, a court should declare
that interpretation; it should not declare that it is a nonjusticiable
political question.
Under the third prong of the Baker test, a court should consider
whether it can decide the case "without [making] an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion . . . .

In

Baldrige III, the policy decisions have already been made; Congress
has stated its policy in the legislative history to the Pelly and
133. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
134. See infra text accompanying note 175.
135. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1968); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
136. Compare Goldwater,444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., concurring) with Chicago Southern
Air Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 111.
137. See Henkin, supra note 112, at 612-13. Henkin also states:
Despite common impressions and numerous citations, there [is] . . .no foreign affairs case, in which the Supreme Court ordained or approved such judicial abstention
from constitutional review . . . . In the foreign affairs cases commonly cited the
courts did not refrain from judging political actions by constitutional standards; they
judged them but found them constitutionally not wanting. If the Court sometimes
spoke of the special quality of foreign relations and the need for the nation to speak
with one voice, it did so not to support judicial abstention but to explain the broad
constitutional powers granted the President or Congress.
L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 213.
138. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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Packwood-Magnuson Amendments and the Secretary of Commerce
has stated its policy decisions in the November Executive Agreement. 139 It might be argued, however, that, since these two policy
statements conflict, a court, by deciding the case, must choose between the two. Thus, it might be claimed that a court is usurping the
legislative power of Congress. 14° This argument, however, confuses
the role of the courts. The issue in Baldrige III is not which policy
statement is most appropriate, but whether each political branch had
constitutional authority to act as it did. Since the policy decisions
have already been made, Baldrige III is justiciable under the third
prong of the Baker test.
Under the fourth prong of the Baker test, a court should consider
whether deciding the case will demonstrate "lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government ....
,,141 In Baidrige III, while
it would not demonstrate a lack of respect due either the Executive or
Congress to perform a statutory interpretation of the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, it might demonstrate a lack of
respect for the Executive if a court abrogated an executive agreement.
However, it might be equally disrespectful to Congress for a court to
nullify the statute. It might be argued that if there is a possibility of
showing disrespect to either branch of the government, then a case is
nonjusticiable. This prong of the Baker test, however, is more convincing when the acts of only one branch of the government are under
judicial scrutiny. Since Baldrige III involves independent actions by
both Congress and the Executive, the utility of this prong of the Baker
test is suspect.
Under the fifth prong of the Baker test, a court should consider
whether there is "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made."' 142 Because Baldrige III involves an
unresolvable conflict between action by the Executive and by Congress, there is not an unquestioning need for adherence to a political
decision already made; there is an unusual need for resolution of an
unresolvable conflict between two political decisions already made.
Also, in Baldrige III, there is no overriding concern or emergency
situation which requires an unquestioning adherence to the decision
139. See Baldrige 111, 768 F.2d at 429-31, 435-44; November Executive Agreement and
Summary of Discussions, supra note 41.
140. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a

Congress ....
141.
142.

" Id.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Id.
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of the Executive. 43
Under the final prong of the Baker test, a court should consider
whether there exists the possibility "of embarrassment from multifari144
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question."'
The dissent refers to this prong of the Baker test, yet fails to provide
any specific explanation of what that embarrassment involves. 145
Also, as mentioned above, there has already occurred multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one issue. Although, as
the dissent states, "the district court's order has added the Judicial
Branch's voice to this delicate process [of foreign affairs], ' 146 the

court has attempted to alleviate the embarrassment by resolving the
issue judiciously. Thus, this prong seems to almost require adjudication of the case, rather than preclude it.
Therefore, none of the six factors of the Baker test seem to firmly
establish the nonjusticiability of Baldrige III under the political question doctrine. In addition, since Baldrige III involves a direct conflict
between legitimate acts of authority by both political branches, Baldrige III should be adjudicated to resolve this basic separation of
powers issue.
3. Goldwater v. Carter
Goldwater v. Carter147 contains one of the Supreme Court's most
recent analysis of the political question doctrine as it relates to foreign
affairs, and is similar in many ways to the Baldrige situation. In Goldwater, twenty-five Congressmen sued the President for terminating a
mutual defense treaty with Taiwan without prior Senate approval. 48
The plaintiffs claimed that the President exceeded his constitutional
power when he terminated the treaty. 149 Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the plurality, 150 held that the case involved a nonjusticiable polit143. But see infra note 199. Typically, in emergency situations involving international
affairs, Congress gives the executive very broad powers. See, e.g., International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1983). Baldrige III does not involve such a
dire situation.
144. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
145. Baldrige 11I, 768 F.2d at 447 (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
148. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950-51 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697
(D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated 444 U.S. 996 (1979); 617 F.2d at 700-01.
149. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997-98.
150. Joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart and Justice Stevens.
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ical question.' 5
One rationale for Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Goldwater was
that the Constitution was silent as to the Senate's role in treaty abrogation. 152 Baldrige III is distinguishable, however, because the Pelly
and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments seek to regulate foreign commerce and the Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce. 5 3 In Goldwater, Justice Rehnquist
specifically referred to the Congress' authority to regulate foreign
commerce as one of "a variety of powerful tools for influencing foreign policy decisions that bear on treaty matters."'' 54 Thus, the majority's holding in Baldrige III that Congress' power to regulate foreign
commerce voids a conflicting executive agreement is consistent with
Goldwater.
Another rationale for Justice Rehnquist's finding of nonjusticiability in Goldwater was that the case involved foreign affairs and the
deployment of military forces. 5 5 Although BaldrigeIII does involve
foreign affairs, it does not involve the use or deployment of military
forces. Thus, this second rationale does not render Baldrige III
nonjusticiable.
The third rationale for Justice Rehnquist's decision in Goldwater
was that the case involved a dispute between co-equal branches of the
federal government, rather than private litigants. 15 6 Unlike Goldwater, however, the plaintiffs in Baldrige III are individuals who do not
have "resources available to protect and assert [their] interests
....

,"157 other

than by resorting to the judiciary. Thus, this third

rationale also does not render Baldrige III nonjusticiable.
The Rehnquist opinion has been criticized for its unusual treatment of the political question doctrine and its implied rejection of the
Baker analysis.' 58 Also, no clear rule regarding the political question
doctrine emerges from Goldwater, because there was no majority
opinion. Justice Marshall concurred in the result without joining the
151. Id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 1005.
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
154. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004 n.I (quoting Wright, C.J., concurring in Goldwater, 617
F.2d at 715-16, quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 44A-45A).
155. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003-04.
156. Id. at 1004.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Note, Justiciability and Foreign Affairs - The Treaty Power, 46 Mo. L.
REV. 164, 176-79 (1981). See also Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998-1001 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Rehnquist analysis.1 59 Justice Powell, who concurred in the judgment
because he believed the case was not ripe for adjudication, stated that
if the case had been ripe, it would have been justiciable under the
60
Baker test. 1
Justice Powell applied the Baker test to Goldwater.1 6 1 He recognized that the Constitution did not specifically state the role of the
Senate in treaty termination.162 Yet, judicially discoverable standards
do exist to determine the issue, he stated, because resolution "only
requires [the Court] to apply normal principles of interpretation of the
constitutional provision at issue."1 6 3 This same reasoning should ap-

ply to Baldrige III, even though the Constitution does not state
whether a subsequent executive agreement supersedes a prior inconsistent act of Congress.
Justice Powell further concluded that prudential considerations,
such as embarrassment from multiple pronouncements or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,
are not present. 64 Justice Powell, in a hypothetical which is particularly applicable to the controversy in Baldrige III, asserted that:
If the President and the Congress had reached irreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question presented by this case would
eliminate, rather than create, multiple constitutional interpretations. The specter of the Federal Government brought to a halt
because of the mutual intransigence of the President and Congress
would require this Court to provide a resolution. . .. 165
In Baldrige III, both Congress and the Secretary have reached irreconcilable positions. As a result, the Court should act to resolve the
situation. 166
After Goldwater, there is great confusion regarding the applica159.

Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.

160. Id. at 997-1002.
161. Id. AT 998-1002.
162.
163.

Id. at 999.
Id. (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969)).

164. Id. at 1000.
165. Id. at 1001.
166. Justice Brennan, dissenting, also believed the issue was justiciable and did not involve
a political question. Id. at 1006. Justice Brennan stated that "the issue of decisionmaking
authority must be resolved as a matter of constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls within the competence of the courts." Id. at 1007. He would affirm the decision,
since the Constitution commits to the President sole authority to recognize or withdraw recognition of a foreign country. Id. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissented in part,
holding that the justiciability and merits of the case deserved greater consideration. Id. at
1006.
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tion of the political question doctrine to cases involving foreign affairs. Yet, as indicated above, there are several statements in
Goldwater which support the conclusion that a court must resolve the
BaldrigeIII case, because of the irreconcilable positions of the Executive and Congress. Thus, although the majority in Baldrige III failed
both to perform the detailed analysis required in Baker and to distinguish Baldrige III from Goldwater, the majority in Baldrige III correctly concluded that the case is justiciable.
B.

Executive Agreements and the Separation of Powers

In Baldrige III, Judge Wright determined that the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments required the Secretary of Commerce to certify the Japanese for any IWC quota violation. 67 However, in the November Executive Agreement the Secretary of
Commerce expressly agreed not to certify the Japanese for IWC quota
violations, if certain conditions were met. 168 Judge Wright concluded
that "the executive agreement. . . was entered into in violation of the
Secretary's statutory mandate."' 16 9 The court did not explicitly void
the November Executive Agreement. Yet, by ordering the Secretary
of Commerce to certify the Japanese, the court, in essence, rendered
the November Executive Agreement void. Although not mentioned
by either the majority or dissent, whether an executive agreement supersedes a prior inconsistent act of Congress is one of the great unsettled questions of constitutional law as it applies to foreign affairs. 70
As part of the rationale for its order, the majority in BaldrigeIII,
stated that "it is imperative to remember that the Legislative Branch,
by explicit constitutional provision, has the power to regulate foreign
commerce.' 7' This statement suggests that subsequent executive
agreements do not supersede prior inconsistent statutes based on Congress' explicit constitutional authority in foreign affairs. Such a conclusion involves several very basic assumptions about the separation
of foreign affairs powers between Congress and the Executive. In the
following sections, Supreme Court and lower court decisions will be
167. Baldrige III, 768 F.2d at 444.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 4-4, at 170-71; Comment, Self-Executing
Executive Agreements: A Separation of Powers Problem, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 137, 150-51
(1974); 1 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 135 Reporter's Note 5 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
171. Baldrige III, 768 F.2d at 444.
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analyzed regarding this issue. Special emphasis will be placed on the
rationale for these decisions and their applicability to Baldrige III.
1. The separation of powers doctrine in foreign affairs
While the Constitution explicitly grants some important foreign
73 it fails to
affairs powers to Congress 72 and some to the President,
mention many other important foreign affairs powers.174 As one author states, the Constitution is "hopelessly vague as to the allocation
of the foreign affairs power among the various branches of the Federal
Government."'' 7 5 In general the Constitution explicitly vests all legislative powers in Congress, all executive powers in the President, and
all judicial powers in the Judiciary.1 76 However, strict application of
this separation of powers to matters involving foreign affairs has been
questioned. 77 Two Supreme Court cases, United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp.178 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,17 9 present both sides of this debate.
a. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
In Curtiss-Wright,Justice Sutherland rejected a strict application
of the separation of powers doctrine to foreign affairs matters. 80 In
that case, the defendant, a military weapons exporter, was indicted for
conspiring to sell weapons to a foreign country in violation of a Congressional Joint Resolution and a Presidential Proclamation.' 8 ' The
Joint Resolution authorized the President, as he deemed necessary, to
prohibit all weapons sales made in the United States to nations in the
Chaco region of South America. 82 President Roosevelt issued a
172. See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
174. L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 16.
175. Mathews, The ConstitutionalPower of the President to Conclude InternationalAgreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 371 (1955).
176. See U.S. CoNsT. arts. I, II & III.

177.

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 304, 315-16 (1936);

Mathews, supra note 175, at 373-74. Mathews argues that the purpose of the separation of
powers was to prevent autocracy, which could result in the loss of individual's rights. But,
because the foreign affairs power involves the interaction between nations, which rarely affects
individual rights, the separation of powers doctrine should not apply. Id.
178. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
179. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
180. 299 U.S. at 315-16.
181. Id. at 311.
182. Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 311-12 (citing Joint Resolution of May 28, 1934, 48 Stat.

811).
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proclamation pursuant to this Joint Resolution which the defendant
subsequently violated. 183 The defendant claimed that the Joint Resolution was an unlawful delegation of congressional power, because it
84
gave absolute discretion to the President.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the majority, held that the broad
delegation of authority by Congress to the President was appropriate
because "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations and its sole representative with foreign nations."''8 5 He favored the predominance of the Executive in foreign affairs because:
(a) important, complicated and delicate decisions may be involved,
(b) unity of design may be necessary, (c) extreme secrecy may be required, (d) quick resolution may be necessary, (e) the President may
have superior knowledge or competence, and (f) avoidance of embar86
rassment to a court or the government is required.1
Many of these rationale for the rule in Curtiss-Wrightdo not apply to the facts in Baldrige III. Assuming that the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments create a mandatory duty, the important, complicated and delicate decision had already been made by
Congress. Also, unity of design requires that the Executive abide by
the previously enacted statute. There is no evidence in Baidrige III
that secrecy was required or that the Executive had superior knowledge or competence. 8 7 Quick resolution was not necessary because, if
the statute was mandatory, the Secretary of Commerce did not have
any discretion to make a quick resolution. To avoid embarrassment
to Congress, the Secretary should have exercised his mandatory duty.
Justice Sutherland, in Curtiss-Wright, also stated that all of the
inherent powers of a sovereign nation, in the exercise of foreign af183. Id. at 312-13 (citing Proclamation of May 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 1744 repealedby Proclamation of November 14, 1935, 49 Stat. 3480).
184. Id. at 314-15.
185. Id. at 319 (quoting John Marshall).
186. Id. at 319-21. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 450-53 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
187. Congress closely follows the activities of the IWC. The House Subcommittee on
Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
conducts hearings both before and after each IWC annual meeting. See, e.g., BaldrigeI, 604 F.
Supp. at 1402-03 (citing Preparationsfor the 34th Int'l Whaling Comm'n Meeting: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and InternationalOrganizationsof the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Congressional Research Service Report), Review of the 33rd Int'l Whaling Comm 'n Meeting: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Human
Rights and InternationalOrganizationsofthe House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) and Review of the 34th Int'l Whaling Comm'n Meeting, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1982)).

American Cetacean Society v. Baldrige

1986]

fairs, are vested in the federal government. 88 He concluded that the
origin of the foreign affairs powers of the federal government "did not
depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."19 However,
Justice Sutherland did not indicate how these inherent powers were
distributed between Congress and the Executive.
As a result of the Curtiss-Wright decision, it has been assumed
that the President has extensive inherent powers in foreign affairs that
far exceeed those powers enumerated under the Constitution.' 90 Yet,
the majority in BaidrigeIII, as part of the rationale for its order, relies
heavily on the fact that the Constitution explicitly granted to Congress sole authority to regulate foreign commerce. 19' Curtiss-Wright
suggests that the November Executive Agreement in Baldrige III
should supersede the prior act of Congress, because of the supremacy
of the Executive in foreign affairs.1 92 The "inherent power" doctrine
discussed in Curtiss-Wright, however, has been criticized in recent

years. 193
b.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

A very different view of the proper balance between Congress
and the Executive was stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 194 In Youngstown, several domestic steel companies sued the Secretary of Commerce for taking possession of their steel mills upon
order of the President. 195 The President ordered the seizure of the
mills to avert a steel workers strike which allegedly jeopardized national security. 19 6 The steel companies claimed that the President had
usurped Congress' legislative power; the President relied on his con188. Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 315-19.
189. Id. at 318.
190. See L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 45. Henkin explains:
It is not apparent that either [the terms] "foreign affairs power" or "sole organ"
aspires to legal precision or that they imply different measures of constitutional authority; both have come to describe a constitutional "power," supplementing if not
subsuming those specified, supporting a variety of Presidential actions not expressly
authorized by the Constitution.

Id.
191. See supra note 171.
192. But see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636 n.2.
193. See Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1973). "Curtiss-Wright does not support the existence of an
extra-constitutional base for federal authority, [or] broad independent executive authority

....

1' Id.
194. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
195. Id. at 582.
196. Id. at 582-83.
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stitutional powers as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief as authority for his action. 19 7 Justice Black found for the steel companies,
stating that "[in the framework of our Constitution, the President's
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and
the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. '1 98 This statement conflicts sharply
with the "inherent power theory" of Justice Sutherland in CurtissWright. Thus, in Baldrige III, Justice Black would probably conclude
that by entering into the November Executive Agreement contrary to
the acts of Congress, the Secretary's action was unconstitutional
lawmaking.
Justice Jackson, concurring in Youngstown, took a position between the two extremes of Justice Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright and
Justice Black in Youngstown. He stated that:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts
can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. 199
In this passage, Justice Jackson seems to suggest that an executive
agreement may supersede a prior inconsistent statute if "scrutinized
with caution. '' 2°° Yet, he fails to indicate what must be scrutinized
when making such a determination. By stating that the President's
power is "at its lowest ebb,"' 20 1 rather than nonexistent, Justice Jackson seems to indicate that some executive agreements do supersede
prior inconsistent acts of Congress.
197. Id. at 582.
198. Id. at 587.
199. Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Jackson, commenting on the power of the President to exercise his inherent power in emergencies, stated:
[The forefathers] knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for
authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We
may also suspect that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies .... I do
not think we rightfully may so amend their work . ...
Id. at 650. But see Mathews, supra note 175, at 375.

200.

343 U.S. at 637-38.

201.

Id. at 637.
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Although Youngstown is sometimes referred to as a domestic affairs case which has little application to foreign affairs, 20 2 this passage
of Justice Jackson's opinion seems directly applicable to the facts in
Baldrige III. In Baldrige III, the executive agreement was found to
be incompatible with the court's interpretation of the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 20 3 Justice Jackson correctly
points out that much of the Court's opinion in Curtiss-Wright is dictum.2° 4 He also states that "[ilt was intimated [in Curtiss-Wright]
that the President might act in external affairs without congressional
authority, but not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress. '205 Thus, in Baldrige III, Justice Jackson would probably conclude, assuming the acts of Congress created a mandatory duty on the
Secretary, that the executive agreement was void.
2.

The constitutional authority for executive agreements
An executive agreement is an international agreement between
the United States and a foreign nation which was entered into by
means other than the treaty power. 20 6 Executive agreements are often
classified into three groups-those entered into pursuant to a treaty,
those entered into pursuant to an act of Congress (also referred to as
congressional-executive agreements), and those entered into pursuant
to the constitutional authority of the President (also referred to as sole
executive agreements). 207 Executive agreements entered into pursuant to a treaty and those entered into pursuant to an act of Congress
are considered "the Supreme Law of the Land" by the supremacy
clause. 208 Accordingly, these executive agreements supersede prior
202. It is often claimed that Youngstown only applies to domestic affairs, since the seizure
of the steel plants occurred in the United States. See L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 96. Yet, the
President claimed in Youngstown that his action was justified by his express constitutional
powers in foreign affairs. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
203. Baldrige 111, 768 F.2d at 444.
204. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636 n.2.
205. Id.
206. See State Department Procedures on Treaties and Other International Agreements,
partial text of Circular 175 (Oct. 25, 1974), 11 F.A.M. 700, 721.2(b) (Foreign Affairs Manual),

reprinted in HOUSE

COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 3 LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1980 92-93 (Joint Comm. Print
1981) [hereinafter cited as Circular 175]. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1. "[The President]

shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .
I..."
Id.
207.

See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 206-07

(2d ed. 1983).
208.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 4-4 at 167-68;

Note, Superseding Statutory Law By Sole Executive Agreement: An Analysis of the American

356

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.

[Vol. 8:327

inconsistent acts of Congress. 20 9 Sole executive agreements, however,
do not have the same status. The November Executive Agreement in
Baldrige III was a sole executive agreement. 2 10 It is estimated that
sole executive agreements constitute less than three percent of all executive agreements signed. 2 11
Although the Constitution does not expressly grant to the President authority to enter into sole executive agreements, a sole executive agreement is considered valid if it was entered into pursuant to
one of the express constitutional powers of the President in foreign
affairs. 2 12 These powers include the power to act as Commander in
Chief of the armed forces,2 13 to receive ambassadors, 21 4 to represent
the nation as the Chief Executive, 2 15 and to take care that the laws of
the United States are faithfully executed. 2 16 Yet, as seen in CurtissWright, the powers of the President are considered to be quite
broad. 2 17 As Professor Henkin correctly points out, no executive
218
agreement has ever been held to be invalid for a lack of authority.
Another commentator has written that "[tihe outer limits of the President's independent power to make agreements have never been
2 19
clear."
Law Institute'sShift in Position, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, 673 (1983). RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 143 (1965).
209.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES §§ 142-43 (1965).
210. See Summary of Discussions, supra note 41.
211. Stevenson, supra note 1, at 840. Of this three percent, even fewer actually conflict
with prior acts of Congress. Thus, even if the Supreme Court affirms the court of appeals
decision, there will be little significant effect on existing executive agreements.
212. See Circular 175, supra note 206, at § 721.2(b)(3). "The President may conclude an
international agreement on any subject within his constitutional authority so long as the agreement is not inconsistent with legislation enacted by the Congress in the exercise of its constitutional authority." Id. (emphasis added).
213. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
214. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
215. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
216. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
217. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-21.
218. L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 179.
219. Mathews, supra note 175, at 370-71. See also, P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:

CASES AND MATERIALS 409 (1975):

[T]he Constitution does not explicitly indicate how authority over foreign affairs is
allocated within the national government, and the history surrounding the adoption
of the Constitution is also largely silent. For these reasons, and because so few of the
issues have been submitted to adjudication, the present scheme is largely the product
of assertion, acquiescence, and inertia, rather than of principled constitutional decisionmaking. The boundaries of inherent executive authority in the silence of Congress remain obscure, as does the extent of Congress' constitutional powers to
constrain the executive's conduct of foreign relations.
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However, Congress is also expressly granted constitutional powers in foreign affairs. Under Article I, Congress has the power to
"regulate commerce with foreign Nations, ' 220 to tax and spend "for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,"'2 2' to
"declare War, ' 222 to "raise and support Armies, ' 22 3 and to "provide
and maintain a Navy."' 224 Further, a subsequent act of Congress
voids a prior inconsistent executive agreement. 225 Henkin suggests
that an executive agreement should supersede a prior inconsistent act
of Congress, because if Congress does not approve of the executive
agreement it may enact a subsequent statute that voids that agreement. 226 Although no Supreme Court cases have held that an executive agreement supersedes a prior act of Congress, there are some
2 27
lower court decisions that suggest the contrary.
3.

Lower court decisions

The majority in Baldrige III, in effect, concluded that the November Executive Agreement did not supersede the Secretary of
Commerce's statutory mandate to certify the Japanese for IWC quota
violations. 22 8 Neither the majority nor the dissent, however, discussed or distinguished the few lower court cases which discuss this
issue. In the following sections, these cases will be reviewed to determine the rationales supporting the decisions.
a.

United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.

In United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,229 the United States sued
a U. S. potato importer for damages arising out of an alleged breach
Id.
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434, 448 (1979). In Gibbons v. Ogden, Justice Marshall stated that:
[i]f, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to

specific objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would
be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the
exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11.
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.12.

224.

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.13.

225.
226.

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case).
L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 186.

227. See infra notes 229-315 and accompanying text.
228.
229.

Baldrige 111, 768 F.2d at 444.
204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953) affid on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
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of a Canadian seed potato import contract. In a 1948 executive agreement between the United States and Canada, 230 Canada agreed to
limit potato exports to the United States to potatoes that would be
resold for seed purposes only; no potatoes would be exported to the
United States that would be resold for table stock. 231 In turn, the
Executive agreed not to place any quantity limitations or fees on Canadian potatoes. 232 According to the executive agreement, all Canadian potato export contracts had to have a clause in which the
importer asserted that the potatoes would only be sold for seed purposes. 233 The U.S. potato importer entered into a contract to import
Canadian seed potatoes, giving assurances to U.S. officials and to the
Canadian exporter that the potatoes would only be used for seed purposes. 234 The importer then sold the potatoes to a retail grocery
chain.235

Prior to the 1948 Executive Agreement between the United
States and Canada, Congress passed the Agricultural Act of 1948.236
Under this statute, the United States established a price support program for both table stock and seed potatoes. 237 However, since excessive imports could frustrate the purpose for the price supports, the
Act also established a procedure to be used by the President to deter-

mine if import limitations should be imposed. 238 If the President suspected that imports were "rendering ineffective" the price support
230. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 348 U.S. 296, 305-09 (1955) (app. to opinion).
The appendix to the Supreme Court opinion contains the full text of the exchange of correspondence which established the 1948 executive agreement [hereinafter cited as 1948 Executive Agreement].
231. 348 U.S. at 306.
232. Id. at 307.
233. Id. at 306.
234. Id.
235. 204 F.2d at 657.
236. Agricultural Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-897, 62 Stat. 1247-50.
237. Id. at 1248. The United States was obligated to purchase from eligible growers all
Irish potatoes at 90 percent of their parity price if they could not be sold commercially. Id. In
1948, the United States and Canada produced one of the largest crops of Irish potatoes on
record. Capps, 296 U.S. at 297.
238. Agricultural Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-897, 62 Stat. 1247-48. The Act states that:
(a) Whenever the President has reason to believe that any article or articles are being
. . . imported into the United States. . . [so] as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, any program or operation undertaken under this
title. . . he shall cause an immediate investigation to be made . . . . (b) If, on the
basis of such investigation and report to him. . . the President finds the existence of
such facts, he shall be proclamation impose such. . . quantitative limitations on any
article or articles [as necessary so as not to render the program ineffective] Provided,
That no proclamation. . . shall impose any limitation. . . which reduces such permissible total quantity to proportionately less then 50 per centum of the total quan-
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system, he was required to order an investigation into the matter. 239
Based on the findings of this investigation, the President could impose
import limitations as he deemed necessary, but in no event could the
import limitation exceed fifty percent. 24°
Prior to entering into the executive agreement with Canada, the
President did not request an investigation, review any findings or decide if import limitations were necessary. 241 Yet, by signing the 1948
Executive Agreement with Canada, the President indicated that he
considered imports to be a problem. Chief Judge Parker of the
Fourth Circuit held that:
Since the purpose of the agreement as well as its effect was to bar
imports which would interfere with the [Agricultural Act of 1948],
it was necessary that the provisions of this statute be complied with
and an executive agreement excluding such imports which failed to
comply with [the Agricultural Act of 1948] was void. 242
The court rejected claims by the United States that the Constitution granted either express or implied powers to the Executive Branch
which authorized the executive agreement. 243 Chief Judge Parker relied heavily on the fact that: (a) the Constitution vested sole authority
in Congress to regulate foreign commerce 244 and (b) the Executive is
constitutionally required to faithfully execute the laws, including acts
of Congress which regulate foreign commerce. 245 Combining these
two provisions, Chief Judge Parker held that "[w]hatever the power
of the executive was with respect to making executive trade agreements regulating foreign commerce in the absence of action by Congress, it is clear that the executive may not through entering into such
tity of such article or articles which was entered.
as determined by the President ....

. .

during a representative period

Id. at 1249.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.

241. Capps, 204 F.2d at 658-59.
242. Id. at 659.
243. Id.
244. Id. Chief Judge Parker stated that: "the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce is not among the powers incident to the Presidential office, but is expressly vested
by the Constitution in the Congress." Id. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. "[The Congress
shall have power] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign nations.
...
Id.
245. 204 F.2d at 659 ("The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty
that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave
within his power.") (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added)). See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. "[The President] shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.
...
Id.

360
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an agreement avoid complying with a regulation prescribed by
Congress.

24 6

There is much confusion, however, regarding the validity of the
Fourth Circuit decision in light of the subsequent Supreme Court decision which affirmed on other grounds.2 47 The Supreme Court held
that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant
breached the contract.2 48 Therefore, the Court never discussed the
Fourth Circuit's analysis of the Executive's power to enter into execu249
tive agreements contrary to prior acts of Congress.

Nevertheless, the Capps case provides some insight into the issue
of whether an executive agreement supersedes a prior inconsistent
statute. Some courts have concluded that, according to Capps, any

executive agreement which conflicts with a prior act of Congress is
void. 250 This is consistent with the court's rationale that the Executive is required to faithfully execute the laws of the United States. 25 '
Yet, Chief Judge Parker also relied heavily upon the fact that only
Congress is granted authority to regulate foreign trade,2 52 suggesting
246. 204 F.2d 659-60. In other places, Chief Judge Parker suggests that the President has
no power to regulate foreign commerce, even if not contrary to an act of Congress (e.g., Imports from a foreign country are. . . subject to regulation by Congress only. Id. at 660.) Such
statements have been correctly criticized. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 180-81. Numerous examples exist of Presidential action relating to foreign trade absent conflicting acts of
Congress. See id. at 181, 429 n.29. Henkin, however, also criticizes the more limited holding
of Capps that an executive agreement is void in light of a prior act of Congress. Id. at 186.
247. Compare, L. TRIBE, supra note 75, at 171 ("At a minimum, it seems clear that an
executive agreement, unlike a treaty, cannot override a prior act of Congress.") (footnote omitted) with C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 260 and n.8 (3d ed. 1977) ("The
Supreme Court has not determined whether an executive agreement will supersede an earlier
act of Congress with which it is in disagreement.") and J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 207, at 211 ("[An] executive agreement is... the supreme law of the land. . . and
probably prevails over earlier Congressional enactments if the President is, in fact, entering
into an agreement pursuant to his presidential authority in the field of foreign relations.").
248. 348 U.S. 296, 297 (1955). Because the retail grocery distributor to whom the defendant sold the potatoes sold both table stock and seek potatoes and because the defendant had
sole potatoes for seed purposes to the distributor previously, there was insufficient evidence to
conclude that the defendant had breached the contract. In essence the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Va.
1951). However, after argument was heard, the district court directed a verdict for defendant.
The opinion was not published, but is reproduced, in part, at 348 U.S. 300-01. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals "[had] little difficulty in seeing in the evidence breach of contract on
the part of defendant ....
204 F.2d at 658.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Colo. 1983).
251. Capps, 204 F.2d at 659.
252. Id.
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that only executive agreements attempting to regulate areas specifi253
cally allocated to Congress by the Constitution are void.
Thus, under this more narrow interpretation, a court must determine whether the area regulated by the executive agreement has been
specifically allocated to Congress by the Constitution. The narrower
interpretation, however, does not address whether executive agreements which attempt to regulate areas not specifically allocated by the
Constitution to Congress or the Executive and which conflict with
prior acts of Congress are valid. 2 54 In Baldrige III, it is undisputed
that the act of Congress falls under Congress' authority to regulate
foreign commerce. 255 Also, the November Executive Agreement was
not closely tied to any of the express constitutional powers of the
256
President.
The Capps rationale is especially convincing when applied to Baldrige III, because the facts of the two cases and the wording of the
statutes are so similar. The purpose of both the Agricultural Act of
1948 in Capps and the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments
in Baldrige III was to delegate to the Executive some discretion, but
with some limitations on that delegation. Also, both of these statutes
involved Congress' exclusive authority to regulate foreign commerce.
b.

Seery and Swearingen

Besides Capps, two other lower court cases, Seery v. United
States2 57 and Swearingen v. United States,258 seem to suggest that an
executive agreement does not supersede a prior inconsistent act of
Congress. In Seery, a United States citizen sued the United States for
damages to her home in Austria which had been used by the United
States Army after World War 11.259 Because an executive agreement
between the United States and Austria had settled all damage claims
against the United States as to all Austrian property owners for the
time period in question, 260 the United States claimed that the plaintiff
could not recover. 26 1 The district court held that because the use of
253. See, e.g., Security Pacific National Bank v. Government and State of Iran, 513 F.
Supp. 864, 872-73 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
254. See P. BREST, supra note 219.
255. See supra note 220.
256. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
257. 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
258. 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983).
259. Seery, 127 F. Supp. at 602-03.
260. Id. at 606.
261. Id.
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executive agreements is not mentioned in the Constitution, an execu262
tive agreement cannot impair an individual's constitutional rights.
Moreover, the court noted that Congress, by statute, 263 had specifically consented to suits for damage claims and had conferred jurisdiction on the courts to adjudicate such claims. 264 Judge Madden stated:
It would be indeed incongruous if the Executive Department alone,
without even the limited participation by Congress which is present when a treaty is ratified, could not only nullify the Act of Congress consenting to suit on Constitutional claims, but, by nullifying
that Act of Congress, destroy the Constitutional right of a
265
citizen.
Thus, although executive agreements are usually valid instruments of international affairs, the court in Seery suggested that when a
sole executive agreement conflicts with an act of Congress, some limited participation by Congress is required. This is partly because executive agreements are not expressly referred to in the Constitution.
Recall that in Capps, the court concluded that an executiye
agreement does not supersede a prior statute, because the Executive is
required to faithfully execute the laws of the United States, and because the Constitution had expressly granted Congress the authority
to regulate foreign commerce. 266 Yet, Seery suggests that an executive
agreement does not supersede a prior inconsistent act of Congress because it would be incongruous with the treaty ratification procedure. 2 6 7 This rationale has been supported by some commentators. 268
For example, Professor Tribe states "[t]hat the power to conclude executive agreements coincides perfectly with the treaty power seems
untenable, since such a conclusion would emasculate the Senatorial
check on executive discretion that the Framers so carefully embodied
'2 69
in the Constitution.
Yet, according to this "avoidance of the treaty power" rationale
262. Id.
263. The court does not specify the statute in which the United States consents to be sued
and confers jurisdiction on the courts to adjudicate such claims.
264. Id. at 607.
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 251-52 and 258-60 and accompanying text.
267. Seery, 127 F. Supp. at 607.
268. See, e.g., Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DUKE L.J. 619, 626; Berger,
supra note 4, at 49 ("We begin, therefore, with an unambiguous constitutional requirement
that treaties-meaning all international agreements-are to be the joint function of President
and Senate." (emphasis in original)).
269. L. TRIBE, supra note 75, § 4-4, at 171 (footnote omitted).
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all sole executive agreements are invalid, because, by definition, a sole
executive agreement is signed pursuant to only the constitutional authority of the Executive. Sole executive agreements that do not con270
flict with acts of Congress have never been held unconstitutional.
Some authors even suggest that a sole executive agreement is impliedly accepted if Congress does not act.271 It is only when those sole
executive agreements conflict with a prior act of Congress that they
have been questioned. Therefore, the "avoidance of the treaty power"
rationale alone seems insufficient to justify voiding a sole executive
agreement if there is a prior inconsistent act of Congress.
Also, the statute in Seery is very different from the statutes in
Capps and Baldrige. The statute in Seery was a jurisdictional statute
that did not relate to Congress' role in foreign affairs.2 7 2 Congress'
authority to consent to suit for damage claims in United States courts
is not a function of its role in foreign affairs, but instead, is solely
related to Congress' authority in domestic affairs. 273 As CurtissWright and subsequent cases have held, there is a difference between
the separation of powers issue as it pertains to domestic affairs and as
it pertains to foreign affairs. 274 Thus, a more limited interpretation of
Seery might be that a sole executive agreement is void if it is in direct
conflict with a prior act of Congress based on domestic affairs. Both
Capps and Baldrige, are distinguishable from Seery, in that they both
involve statutes that relate to Congress' foreign affairs powers.
Another case which seems to suggest that a sole executive agreement is void which conflicts with a prior inconsistent act of Congress
is Swearingen v. United States.275 In Swearingen, a Panama Canal
270. See L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 179.
271. Id. at 176; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Mathews, supra note 175,
at 370. Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the Constitution states that "[n]o State shall enter into
any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation .... ." It is suggested by Henkin and others, that
because this clause indicates that the Founders conceived of agreements with other nations
other than treaties and because the Constitution does not expressly forbid the executive from
entering into agreements other than treaties, that executive agreements are therefore valid. L.
HENKIN, supra note 1, at 173.
272. Seery, 127 F. Supp. at 607.
273. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.").
274. See supra notes 177-89 and accompanying text. The dissent in Baldrige III stated
that "if this statute involved domestic affairs, I might be able to endorse a decision based on
this secondary evidence of congressional intent." 768 F.2d at 448.
275. 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983).
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Commission 276 employee sought to recover taxes which he alleged
were erroneously assessed against him by the United States. 277 The
plaintiff claimed exemption from United States federal income tax
pursuant to an executive agreement with Panama exempting all taxes
on income received while an employee of the Commission. 278 Internal
Revenue Code § 61(a), however, required the employee to declare his
earnings as income. 279 The district court held that the executive
agreement could not exempt the employee from declaring this income
if contrary to the Internal Revenue Code. 280 As its rationale, the
court decided that while a treaty is the supreme law of the land, an
executive agreement should not be so treated, because it "require[s]
no Senate ratification and [is] not directly authorized by or described
in the Constitution."' 28' This statement is consistent with the reasoning used in Seery,282 which alone was found to be insufficient to support the finding that a sole executive agreement is void as to a prior
83
inconsistent statute. 2
A related issue in Swearingen was whether the executive agreement was so closely related to the Panama Canal Treaty that it should
be considered equivalent to a treaty. 284 In dicta, the court stated that
even a treaty which created a tax exemption contrary to the Internal
Revenue Code would contravene the exclusive constitutional authority of the House of Representatives to originate all bills to raise revenue and, therefore, would be void. 285 This is because, the court

pointed out, the House of Representatives has no role in the treaty
making process; only the Senate and the Executive are involved. 286
Similarly, a sole executive agreement, which contravenes authority
granted exclusively to Congress, would be void. This is consistent
276. The Panama Canal Commission was an agency of the United States government. Id.
at 1020.
277. Id.
278. Id. (citing the Implementation Agreement of the Panama Canal Treaty). Article XV,
para. 2 of the Agreement states that, "United States citizen employees and dependents shall be

exempt
Id.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

from any taxes.

. . on

income received as a result of their work for the Commission."

Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1021-22.
Id.at 1021.
See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
Swearingen, 565 F. Supp. at 1021-22.
Id. at 1022. See, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.1.
See U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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with the narrow interpretation of Capps.28 7
The statute in Swearingen is significantly different from the statutes in Capps and Baldrige. While the statute in Swearingen applied
to income earned in a foreign country, it only taxed United States
citizens. Thus, the statute in Swearingen has purely domestic consequences. The court did not alter the relationship of the United States
to Panama by voiding this provision of the executive agreement. In
this way, the statute is similar to the statute in Seery.288 However, the
statutes in Seery and in Swearingen are distinguishable from the statutes in Capps and Baldrige. Both the Agriculture Act of 1948 and the
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments were clearly intended
to significantly affect foreign affairs. 289 Both statutes were passed pursuant to Congress' constitutional authority in foreign affairs. 290 This
distinction assumes that the concept of separation of powers is different in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs, as stated in CurtissWright.29' Thus, although the language and the rationale of the court
in both Seery and Swearingen support the conclusion that an executive agreement does not supersede a prior inconsistent act of Congress, both cases are distinguishable from Capps and Baldrige based
on the nature of the statutes involved.
c.

Ozanic and Consumer's Union
A few statements in Ozanic v. United States292 seem to suggest
that a sole executive agreement may supersede a prior inconsistent act
of Congress. In Ozanic, an accident between a United States ship and
a Yugoslavian ship during World War II prompted a damage claim
by a British corporation which had been assigned all rights to pursue
the action by the Yugoslavian government. 293 The assignee claimed
the right to intervene pursuant to the Public Vessels Act, 294 in which
the United States consented to be sued. 295 However, in 1948, the Secretary of State signed an executive agreement with Yugoslavia settling
287. See supra notes 244 & 252-53 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 20-22, 27-31 & 236-40 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 63 & 244 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 177-89 and accompanying text. The dissent in Baldrige III stated
that "if this statute involved domestic affairs, I might be able to endorse a decision based on
this secondary evidence of congressional intent." 768 F.2d at 448.
292. 188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951) (Hand, C.J.).
293. Ozanic, 188 F.2d at 229.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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the United States' land-lease benefits claims against Yugoslavia in exchange for releases from several Yugoslavian maritime claims against
the United States during World War 11.296 This executive agreement
was signed under authority of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11,
1941.297

The district court held that the executive agreement prevented
the British assignee from intervening. 298 On appeal, Judge Learned
Hand affirmed, holding that the power of the Executive to settle mutual claims between the United States and a foreign nation was integrally related to the President's sole constitutional authority to
recognize foreign nations. 299 The court relied on the need for "contin-

ued mutual amity between the nation and other powers.

.

.300

The

court stated
these considerations alone would go far to persuade us that, even
though the agreement of 1948 stood only upon the constitutional
power of the President to come to an accommodation with a foreign government upon mutual claims between the two nations, it
would suffice to withdraw the consent to be sued [under the Public
Vessels Act]

.

301

This statement is dicta, however, in light of the subsequent finding of
the court that the Agreement of 1948 was a joint congressional-executive agreement under the Lend-Lease Act of 1941.302
Nevertheless, as the dicta in Ozanic suggests, a relevant consideration when determining whether a sole executive agreement should
supersede a prior inconsistent act of Congress, is whether the executive agreement has been signed pursuant to one of the sole powers
granted to the President under the Constitution. 30 3 This is the converse of the rule in Capps, which considered important whether or not
the act of Congress was entered into pursuant to authority granted
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 83 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
299. Ozanic, 188 F.2d at 231 (referring to United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)
and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30, 240-41 (1942)). See also U.S. CONST. art. II,
.
§ 3 ("[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers ....
300. Ozanic, 188 F.2d at 231.
301. Id. I suggest that the word "though" is an error, and should be replaced with either
"if" or "had" to remove the confusion regarding this passage. These changes are consistent
with the remainder of the quotation which suggests an hypothetical situation. See Note, supra

note 208, at 687-88.
302.
303.

Ozanic, 188 F.2d at 232. See Note, supra note 208, at 687-88.
See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
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solely to Congress by the Constitution. 304 Thus, combining these two
tests, a court should consider both: whether the executive agreement
was entered into pursuant to constitutional authority granted solely to
the Executive; and, whether the act of Congress was enacted pursuant
to constitutional authority granted solely to Congress.
305
A few statements in Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. v. Rogers
seem to suggest that a sole executive agreement does not supersede a
prior inconsistent act of Congress. In Consumers Union, a domestic
steel consumers organization sued the Secretary of State and other
State Department officials, claiming that voluntary steel import restraint arrangements negotiated by the defendants were not only entered into without constitutional authority, but were also contrary to
the Sherman Act and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.306 Under the
Voluntary Restraint Arrangements, which the President had encouraged, foreign steel producers volunteered to reduce steel imports
into the United States. 30 7 The district court held that the Sherman
Act and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 did not preempt the President or other members of the Executive Branch from negotiating
these agreements with foreign producers. 308 Thus, the court concluded that there was no direct conflict between what the statutes required and what the President had done. The court stated that "the
Executive is not preempted and may enter into agreements or diplomatic arrangements with private foreign steel concerns so long as
these undertakings do not violate legislation regulating foreign commerce ....

"1309

Yet, in the voluntary restraint arrangements, the President gave
binding assurances that these arrangements were legal and did not
violate the Sherman Act or the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 3 10 The
district court stated that "the Executive has no authority under the
Constitution or acts of Congress to exempt the Voluntary Restraint
Arrangements on Steel from the antitrust laws and that such arrangements are not exempt."' 31' On appeal, Judge McGowan, for the ma304. See supra notes 244 & 252-53 and accompanying text.
305. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), affd and
partially vacated sub nom., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C.

Cir. 1974).
306.

Rogers, 352 F. Supp. at 1321-22.

307. Id. at 1321.
308. Id. at 1323.
309. Id.
310.
311.

Kissinger, 506 F.2d at 139.
Rogers, 352 F. Supp. at 1323.
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jority affirmed the district court's decision, but vacated the part of the
opinion stating that the Executive did not have constitutional or statutory authority to exempt the foreign steel producers from the antitrust laws. 3 12 Judge McGowan vacated this section of the district
3
court's opinion, because the issue was not before the district court. 31
While the holding of the district court was based on the belief
that the statutes did not preempt the Executive from acting as it did,
the majority in the court of appeals held that the Voluntary Restraint
Arrangements did not create binding agreements between the United
States and the private steel companies. 31 4 Thus, there was no binding
executive agreement to conflict with a congressional statute. In Baldrige III, however, the November Executive Agreement was intended
to be a binding agreement and was, based on the holding of the majority in the court of appeals, in direct conflict with the mandate of the
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 3 15 Therefore, the
court of appeals decision is not in conflict with the holding of the
majority in Baldrige III.
C. A Seven-Step Analysis
The above discussion of Supreme Court and lower court decisions suggests a seven-step analysis to determine whether a sole executive agreement which conflicts with a prior act of Congress is valid.
First, if the executive agreement is not a sole executive agreement, but
rather a congressional-executive agreement or an executive agreement
entered into pursuant to a treaty, then it supersedes a prior act of
Congress. 3 16 Second, if the nations signing the executive agreement
did not intend to create a binding relationship, then there is no executive agreement which must be voided. 3 17 Third, if the disputed terms
of the sole executive agreement can be voided without altering the
relationship of the United States and the other nation or nations involved, then those terms should be voided. 31 8 Fourth, if an individual's constitutional rights are jeopardized by the sole executive
312.
313.
314.
ated and
of 1962.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Kissinger, 506 F.2d at 140-41.
Id.
Id. at 143. Justice Leventhal, dissenting, believed that binding agreements were crethat the executive was preempted by the Sherman Act and the Trade Expansion Act
Id. at 146-65.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208-09 & 302 and accompanying text.
See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 275-291 and accompanying text.
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agreement, it is very likely that the executive agreement will be
voided. 319 Fifth, if the act of Congress is based on a constitutional
power granted solely to Congress, then it is more likely that the sole
executive agreement will be struck down. 320 Sixth, if the sole executive agreement is entered in to pursuant to a constitutional power
granted expressly to the President, then it is more likely that the executive agreement will be preserved. 32' Seventh, the sole executive
agreement should be held valid if any or all of the following
predominate: (a) important, complicated and delicate decisions are
involved; (b) unity of design is necessary; (c) extreme secrecy is required; (d) quick resolution is necessary; (e) the President has superior knowledge or competency; or (f) avoidance of embarrassment to
322
a court or the government is required.
In BaldrigeIII, the executive agreement is a sole executive agreement in which both Japan and the Secretary of Commerce intended to
create a binding relationship. 323 The third step does not apply to Baldrige III, because voiding the November Executive Agreement would
affect the relationship of the United States with Japan. Because Baldrige III does not involve the deprivation of an individual's constitutional rights, the fourth prong is not dispositive. The fifth prong of
the analysis applies to Baldrige III, because the Pelly and PackwoodMagnuson Amendments were based on Congress' sole constitutional
authority to regulate foreign commerce. 324 The sixth prong does not
apply to Baldrige III, because the November Executive Agreement is
not based on a constitutional power granted solely to the President,
but seems to be based on the Executive's inherent powers in foreign
affairs.3 2 5 As discussed above, none of the factors of the seventh
prong apply to the situation in Baldrige 111.326 Therefore, because the
sole executive agreement was not entered into pursuant to sole constitutional grants of authority to the President, because none of the factors mentioned in Curtiss-Wright apply to Baldrige III, and because
the acts of Congress are based on Congress' sole constitutional grant
319. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 41 & 168 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
325. A much more difficult case would be where the act of Congress is based on authority
granted solely to Congress by the Constitution and the sole executive agreement is based on
authority granted solely to the President by the Constitution.
326. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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of authority to regulate foreign commerce, it was appropriate for the
court of appeals to have abrogated the November Executive
Agreement.
V.

CONCLUSION

The focus of this analysis of the Baldrige III decision has been on
the justiciability and separation of powers issues inherent in the majority's finding that a sole executive agreement contravened a prior
inconsistent act of Congress. This note has suggested that there exist
troublesome standing and political question doctrine issues, but that
these issues do not render Baldrige III nonjusticiable. This note has
also suggested a seven-step analysis for determining whether a sole
executive agreement which conflicts with a prior act of Congress
should be held invalid. Application of this analysis to the facts of
Baldrige I leads to the conclusion that the court of appeals correctly
decided to abrogate the November Executive Agreement.
David M. Bassham

